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Deliberation and Decision-Making Process 
in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights: Do Individual Opinions Matter?1* 
 




 The work is focused on the adjudicatory nature of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights and investigates its model of deliberation, considering 
three basic schemes: per curiam, seriatim and hybrid. In order to identify an 
institutional pattern, the importance of individual opinions is analyzed through 
the quantitative performance of each category of judge (ad hoc and regular), 
as well as each type of adjudicative activity (judgments and advisory opinions). 
The quantitative data is also useful to better understand the explicit assimilation 
of separate opinions to the core reasoning of future cases. As a result, it has 
been possible to identify relevant aspects applicable to the main problem of 
whether individual opinions really matter to the Inter-American Court’s 
decision-making process. 
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INTRODUCTION                      
 
 The problem addressed in this article was born from some general issues 
connected to the institutional behavior of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (Inter-American Court), such as the deliberative pattern adopted by the 
Court, the decision-making process developed throughout the Court’s practice, 
and the repercussion of the judges’ individual opinions regarding the reasoning 
of the Inter-American judgments.3 
 In summary, concurrent and divergent opinions have one essential 
characteristic centered in the reasoning that represents the individual views of 
their authors (judges or arbitrators) as distinct from those of the Court as a 
whole.4  
 Due to their profuse number, separate opinions have been used by actors 
of the Inter-American System and the Court itself, as demonstrated by the 
following situations: 
 i) the request for interpretation of an individual opinion related to the 
Quispialaya Vilcapoma case by the Peruvian State, which was 
refused by the Court based on the argument that separate 
opinions shall not be the object of this remedy.5 Prima facie, the 
logical conclusion would be the exclusion of the individual 
opinions from the Court’s reasoning, in spite of the condemned 
State’s contrary understanding; 
 ii) the use of individual opinions as the Court’s reasoning in several 
briefs by demanding States, e.g. the preliminary exception of 
                                                 
3
 For this paper, I have adopted the term “Separate Opinion” as synonym of “Individual 
Opinion” and, to differentiate the respective conclusion according to the collegiate body’s 
position, I assumed the terms “Concurrent Opinion” and “Dissenting Opinion” (or “Divergent 
Opinion”). 
4
 See Farrokh Jhabvala, The Scope of Individual Opinions in the World Court, 13 NETH. Y.B. 
INT’L L. 33, 47 (1982). 
5
 Quispialaya Vilcapoma v. Peru, Interpretation, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 320, 
¶ 25 (Nov. 21, 2016). 




competence presented by Guatemalan State in the Members of 
the Village of Chichupac case6 (separate opinion of Judge García 
Sayán in the case of the Massacres of El Mozote), and the final 
arguments presented by the Venezuelan State in the Ríos et al. 
case7 (separate opinion of Judge García Ramírez in the case of 
the Miguel Castro Castro Prison); 
 iii) the explicit quotation of separate opinions in the quality of judicial 
reasoning by the Court itself, as shown by the judgment in the 
cases of Baena Ricardo et al.8 (individual opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade in the Advisory Opinion OC-18/03), and 
Castañeda Gutman9 (individual opinion of Judge Piza Escalante 
in the Advisory Opinion OC-7/85).  
In principle, identifying such a large amount of individual opinions and their 
argumentative use could intuitively support the perception that the Inter-
American Court’s decision-making process is outlined by aggregating the 
content of separate opinions regarding past judgments. In order to confirm or 
refute this perception, a quantitative analysis may produce interesting results for 
gauging the impact of separate opinions of some judges in comparison to others.  
 In the first part of this paper, I analyze the adjudicative nature of the 
Inter-American Court’s institutional activity in order to identify the theoretical 
models of deliberation and one in which the Court’s deliberative pattern may fit 
in. 
 Next, I attempt to better understand the role of ad hoc judges in the Inter-
American Court as a possible deviation from impartiality and independence in 
judgments, because of their direct national connection with the respondent 
States. 
 Based on these assumptions, I search for patterns of production of 
individual opinions in judgments (June 1987 – Aug. 2017) and advisory 
opinions (Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017) as available at the Court’s website, in order 
to identify whether or not the separate opinions were well-distributed among a 
large number of judges, as an institutional characteristic, or concentrated within 
a small group, which may reveal personal tendencies. 
 At last, I focus on the analysis of separate opinions quoted by the Inter-
American Court at the core reasoning of its subsequent judgments and advisory 




                                                 
6
 Members of the Village of Chichupac and Neighboring Communities of the Municipality of 
Rabinal v. Guatemala, Main Briefs, “Preliminary Exception of Competence and Merits 
Arguments of the Guatemalan State”, ¶¶ 87-102 (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Apr. 17, 2015), 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/aldea_chichupac_gt/contest.pdf. 
7
 Ríos et al. v. Venezuela, Main Briefs, “Final Arguments of the Venezuelan State”, ¶ 3, & n.1 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Sept. 8, 2008), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/luisiana/alefest.pdf. 
8
 Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 104, ¶ 102 n.70 
(Nov. 28, 2003). 
9
 Castañeda Gutman v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184, ¶ 159 n.55 (Aug. 6, 2008).  




I. INTER-AMERICAN COURT: AN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATIVE 
INSTITUTION
 
 According to Jeremy Waldron,10 within a constitutional system based on 
the separation of powers, the distribution of State functions among different 
political structures (or institutions) seems to be the keystone of the constitutional 
theory itself. As a result, the dignity of legislation, the independence of courts 
and the authority of the executive, exercised by fundamentally distinct entities 
and persons, tend to generate, in principle, a political environment that is 
refractory to tyranny and abuse of power.11 
 In my previous work, which analyzed the structure of the World Trade 
Organization (WTO),12 I adopted the Armin von Bogdandy’s model of division 
of functions within that international institution.13 This model postulates:14 
i) an executive function, centered on the attributions of application, 
management and operation of multilateral and plurilateral 
agreements;  
ii) a legislative function, focused on the members’ negotiation forum; 
and 
iii) an adjudicative function, centered on the dispute resolution system.   
 One point deserves special attention regarding the executive function: 
the absence of a central organ within the Inter-American System, which is 
similar to the structure of the WTO. Unlike the model adopted by some 
international organizations (e.g.: International Monetary Fund, World Bank), 
the WTO does not have an executive collegiate body formed by a strict group 
of Members to expedite deliberative and decision-making processes.15 The level 
of decentralization of the System seems even higher when analyzed the role of 
the Organization of American States (OAS) and its organs, especially the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights,16 and the diffuse participation of the 
Member States. 
                                                 
10
 JEREMY WALDRON, Separation of Power and the Rule of Law, in POLITICAL POLITICAL 
THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 45, 46-50 (2016).  
11
 See generally M. DE MONTESQUIEU, Of the Constitution of England, in THE COMPLETE 
WORKS OF M. DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 198 (1777) (discussing the dangers of 
legislative and executive powers vested in one person or one group of people); THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 47 (James Madison) (elucidating the tyrannical dangers of accumulated power in one person 
or one group of people).  
12
 RANIERI LIMA RESENDE, A Estrutura Orgȃnica e Funcional da OMC, in O REGIME JURÍDICO 
DA RESPONSABILIDADE DAS ORGANIZAÇÕES INTERNACIONAIS: CONTRIBUIÇÕES À ANÁLISE DE 
SUA APLICABILIDADE À ORGANIZAÇÃO MUNDIAL DO COMÉRCIO 87 (2010).  
13
 Id. at 88-89. 
14
 Armin von Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO – Strategies to Cope with a Deficient 
Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 609, 614-17 (2001).  
15
 See PETER VAN DEN BOSSCHE AND WERNER ZDOUC, THE LAW AND POLICY OF THE WORLD 
TRADE ORGANIZATION: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS 132-34 (4th ed. 2017); MARY E. 
FOOTER, AN INSTITUTIONAL AND NORMATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 38 (2006). 
16
 Organization of American States, Charter (A-41), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/dil/inter_
american_treaties_A-41_charter_OAS.asp (“Article 106. There shall be an Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, whose principal function shall be to promote the observance 




 On the other hand, the legislative function is exercised by the fora of the 
States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights and the Member 
States of the OAS, who negotiate treaties and produce international normative 
acts applicable to the whole Inter-American System. 
 Inspired by this paradigm and considering the institutional design of the 
Inter-American System of Human Rights, it is possible to see that the Inter-
American Court has developed an adjudicative function per excellence.17 
Through its jurisdiction over litigant matters, the Court produces international 
rulings to resolve disputes based on obligations mandated by the American 
Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San José, Costa Rica, 1969) in cases of 
violation of human rights.18 In this sense, the Court only judges the behavior of 
States Parties which have expressly accepted its jurisdiction.   
 As well criticized by José E. Alvarez,19 the classic, old-fashioned 
prototype of adjudication in international law involved strict elements: 
independent judges, relatively precise and pre-existing legal norms, adversary 
proceedings, and a dichotomous decision in which one of the parties should 
prevail. According to this formal perspective, the production of advisory 
opinions would not be part of the adjudicatory activity. 
 Nevertheless, inspired by Henry J. Steiner’s work,20 Alvarez 
understands that it is possible to include the human rights regional court’s 
consultative function within the sphere of adjudication,21 based on the legal 
effects of advisory opinions beyond the boundaries of a single dispute, in order 
to promote dialogues on human rights norms between international and national 
                                                 
and protection of human rights and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these 
matters.”). 
17
 See ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE, EL EJERCICIO DE LA FUNCIÓN JUDICIAL 
INTERNACIONAL: MEMORIAS DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 57-72 
(2011); see also Thomas Buergenthal, Implementation of the Judgments of the Court, in 
MEMORIA DEL SEMINARIO “EL SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS DERECHOS 
HUMANOS EN EL UMBRAL DEL SIGLO XXI” 185, 186-91 (2d ed. 2003).  
18
 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123, http://www.oas.org/dil/treaties_B-
32_American_Convention_on_Human_Rights.htm (“Article 63. 1. If the Court finds that there 
has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that 
the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated. It shall also 
rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach 
of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured party. 2. 
In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to 
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has 
under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the 
request of the Commission”). 
19
 JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 521-26 (2005). 
20
 Henry J. Steiner, Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the 
Human Rights Committee?, in THE FUTURE OF UN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 15 
(Philip Alston & James Crawford eds., 2000). 
21
 See ALVAREZ, supra note 19, at 540, 545, 558; see also José E. Alvarez, What are 
International Judges for? The Main Function of International Adjudication, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 159, 168-70 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds., 
2014). 




branches and, simultaneously, to decide in advance a number of future probable 
cases.22 
 A good example of this phenomenon may be identified in the advisory 
opinion of Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for 
the Practice of Journalism (1985),23 whose reasoning was adopted by some 
national constitutional and supreme courts in Latin America.24 This advisory 
opinion forbade internationally illicit prerequisites applicable to journalists and 
safeguarded the freedom of expression. As a consequence of the adoption of 
this opinion by some national courts, several cases were not submitted before 
the Inter-American System.  
 In this sense, the adjudicatory activity of the Inter-American Court 
seems to encompass the resolution of cases as well as the production of advisory 
opinions. 
 Although the Pact of San José is the fundamental treaty of the Inter-
American System, its substantive and procedural norms have undergone an 
evident process of expansion. From a formal perspective, the American 
Convention and the OAS Charter are the strong core of the protective 
mechanism, but, from a material point of view, the system’s normative base 
shows highly dynamic characteristics. 
 As registered in specialized legal literature,25 examples of such 
expansion can be found in the express references by the Inter-American Court 
to the Protocol of San Salvador (1988)26 and the Inter-American Convention on 
Forced Disappearance of Persons (1994)27, and likewise other regional treaties 
in which the Court assumes its implicit interpretive capacity, such as the Inter-
                                                 
22
 Hélène Tigroudja, La Compétence Consultative de la Cour Interaméricaine des Droits de 
L’Homme, in LA FONCTION CONSULTATIVE DES JURIDICTIONS INTERNATIONALES 1, 16-21 
(Alain Ondoua & David Szymczak eds., 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1720423. 
23
 Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism 
(Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 5 (Nov. 13, 1985). 
24
 See, e.g., Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Inter-American Human Rights System: Establishing 
Precedents and Procedure in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297, 351-52 
(1995); Jaime Córdoba Triviño, Aplicación de la Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos al Derecho Constitucional Colombiano, ANUARIO DE DERECHO 
CONSTITUCIONAL LATINOAMERICANO 667, 670-71, 680 (2007); André de Carvalho Ramos, 
Supremo Tribunal Federal Brasileiro e o Controle de Convencionalidade: Levando a Sério os 
Tratados de Direitos Humanos, 104 REVISTA DA FACULDADE DE DIREITO DA UNIVERSIDADE 
DE SÃO PAULO 241, 261-64 (2009). 
25
 Accord, e.g., CECILIA MEDINA, THE AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS: CRUCIAL 
RIGHTS AND THEIR THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-4 (2d ed. 2016); Gerald L. Neuman, Import, 
Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 101, 107-08 (2008). 
26
 Organization of American States, Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human 
Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69, 
http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-52.html. 
27
 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention on Forced Disappearance of 
Persons, Jun. 9, 1994, O.A.S.T.S. No. 80, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-60.
html. 




American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture (1985)28 and the 
Convention of Belém do Pará (1994)29. There are also international legal 
standards which cannot be classified as treaties but they are part of the named 
Inter-American Corpus Juris, such as the Inter-American Democratic Charter 
approved by the OAS General Assembly (2001)30 and the OAS Resolution on 
Access to Public Information (2006).31  
 Considering this, we should pay special attention to Article 64 of the 
American Convention,32 according to which the Inter-American Court may 
exercise its consultative jurisdiction for the institutional interpretation of any 
global or regional human rights treaty applicable to the American Continent, if 
the treaty has been ratified by at least one OAS Member.33 
 Another important aspect is the Court’s competence for monitoring the 
compliance with its own judgments and, in the hypothesis of persistent non-
implementation by the recalcitrant State, the Tribunal may report the situation 
before the OAS General Assembly34 for collective deliberation and application 
of institutional measures. In spite of this abstract design, the Court’s 
institutional practice in compliance procedure has revealed a more diffuse, 
                                                 
28
 Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, 
Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-51.html. 
29
 Inter-American Convention on Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence against 
Women, Jun. 9, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1534, http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-61.html. 
30
 Organization of American States, General Assembly Res., Inter-American Democratic 
Charter, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.1 (XXVIII-E/01) (Sept. 11, 2001), http://www.oas.
org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm. 
31
 Organization of American States, General Assembly Res. 2252, Access to Public 
Information: Strengthening Democracy, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/RES.2252 (XXXVI-O/06) 
(June 6, 2006), http://www.oas.org/en/sla/docs/AG03341E09.pdf. 
32
 American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 64. 1. The member states of the Organization 
may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties 
concerning the protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of 
competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization of American 
States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like manner consult the Court. 2. 
The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may provide that state with 
opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its domestic laws with the aforesaid international 
instruments”). 
33
 See, e.g., Tigroudja, supra note 22, at 4-7; JORGE ERNESTO ROA ROA, LA FUNCIÓN 
CONSULTIVA DE LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 34-39 (2015). Cf. 
“Other Treaties” Subject to the Consultative Jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 American 
Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-1/82, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 1, 
¶¶ 35-42 (Sept. 24, 1982). 
34
 American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 65. To each regular session of the General 
Assembly of the Organization of American States the Court shall submit, for the Assembly's 
consideration, a report on its work during the previous year. It shall specify, in particular, the 
cases in which a state has not complied with its judgments, making any pertinent 
recommendations”). 




symbolic role35 which reinforces the conclusion that the political balance 
applicable to non-compliance issues has not produced effective results overall.36 
 In this sense, the structural characteristic of diffusion permeates the 
Inter-American System through the complex interactions between institutional, 
procedural and normative aspects, far from the simplistic perspective of solely 
two participating organs (namely, Inter-American Commission and Court).37 
 Based on the specific adjudicatory function exercised by the Inter-
American Court in the production of international rulings, it is important to 
identify the deliberative model adopted and, in connection, investigate the 
weight of the judges’ individual opinions within the Court’s practice. 
 
II. DELIBERATION AND DECISION 
 After rich academic debate on this article’s initial draft, the best option 
has been to concentrate the analysis on the formation of the Inter-American 
Court’s judgments, especially through the verification of its deliberative 
practice, which includes the identification of the ratio decidendi in the Court’s 
reasoning. A quantitative analysis option aims to map relevant decisional 
patterns in the judicial practice, particularly regarding the explicit importance 
of individual opinions for future cases.38 
 These aspects, which appear simple at first sight, expose relevant 
typologies of the judicial deliberative process that are clearly distinct from the 
final decision-making moment and result. 
 Despite the fact that the two categories reflect a wider spectrum of the 
decision-making process (lato sensu), it is fundamental to distinguish 
“deliberation” from “decision” (stricto sensu). Seen from a temporal 
perspective, deliberation is a prerequisite to the conclusive moment, and it can 
be understood as a necessary interstice within the democratic decision-making 
process, in which an exchange of arguments, communicating discourse and 
rational persuasion take place.39 
 The distinctive schemes of deliberation and decision have their roots in 
the example extracted from the Homeric tradition and quoted by Aristotle. 
According to his Nicomachean Ethics,40 the kings announced their choices to 
                                                 
35
 See Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American Court’s 
Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493, 518-19 (2011). Cf. James L. 
Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights Litigation in Twenty-
First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 768, 824-25 (2008). 
36
 Alexandra Huneeus, Compliance with Judgments and Decisions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 438, 449-51 (Cesare P. R. Romano et al. eds., 2014). 
37
 Cf. Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The Inter-
American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 382-87 
(2008); but cf. Dinah Shelton, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 208-19 (2d 
ed. 2005). 
38
 It is important to register that this specific research does not aim to analyze the external 
repercussions of separate opinions, for instance, before constitutional or supreme courts of the 
States Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights, neither focus on their implicit 
influence on subsequent judgments of the Inter-American Court itself. 
39
 Cícero Araújo, Razão Pública, Bem Comum e Decisão Democrática, in PARTICIPAÇÃO E 
DELIBERAÇÃO: TEORIA DEMOCRÁTICA E EXPERIÊNCIAS INSTITUCIONAIS NO BRASIL 
CONTEMPORÂNEO 157 (Marcos Nobre & Vera Schattan P. Coelho eds., 2004). 
40
 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 43-45 (David Ross transl., 2009). 




the people after prior deliberation. This reveals the judgment to be a direct result 
of the deliberative interstice and centered in the definition not of ends, but of 
means.  
 The capacity to engage in rational action might originate in the 
foundations of the deliberative process,41 in order to allow effective 
communication among persons involved in the decision-making process. 
 In a democratic environment, the primordial commitment is to adopt 
decisions in the public sphere after effective public deliberations, during which 
access to the deliberative forum should be free for all. This would mean every 
citizen must have the capacity to convince and be convinced by good reasons. 
On the other hand, all citizens have an obligation to accept the deliberative 
choice about a public action adopted by the majority.42 
 Obviously, the typical deliberative process before judicial organs does 
not allow the same open participation to all citizens or their Parliamentary 
representatives, as part of deciding each case under judgment. However, given 
that the courts are collegiate institutions, where reasons are generated through 
an internal process of deliberation and guided by applicable norms and based 
on democratic premises, the underlying reasons must become public.43 
 Some difficulties seem to arise from the applicability of the democratic 
concept to non-state institutions, such as international organizations and courts, 
due to the strong limitations to a broad implementation of the majoritarian 
premise in international arena. Nevertheless, the idea of cosmopolitan 
citizenship derived from the Kantian perspective may provide an interesting 
theoretical support,44 especially when visualized the main role of the European 
and Inter-American Courts of Human Rights in protecting individuals and 
minorities against violations performed by public authorities. 
 Through an interesting criticism against the Robert A. Dahl’s conception 
of bureaucratic bargaining system applicable to international organizations, 
which are characterized as non-democratic institutions,45 James Tobin points 
out that the unrestricted majority rule could be disastrous for minorities, for 
equality of citizens (or members) before the law, and for the democratic 
continuity itself.46 
 Even if the democratic nature of international organizations cannot be 
unequivocally assumed, as may demonstrate the role and practice of the UN 
                                                 
41
 See JOSEPH RAZ, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION: ON THE THEORY OF LAW AND 
PRACTICAL REASON 139-40 (2009). 
42
 John Ferejohn, Instituting Deliberative Democracy, 42 NOMOS 75, 79 (2000). 
43
 John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, Constitutional Courts as Deliberative Institutions: 
Towards an Institutional Theory of Constitutional Justice, in CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE, EAST 
AND WEST: DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY AND CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN POST-COMMUNIST 
EUROPE IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 21, 22-25 (Wojciech Sadurski ed., 2003). 
44
 Armin von Bogdandy, The Democratic Legitimacy of International Courts: A Conceptual 
Framework, 14 THEOR. INQ. L. 361, 364-67 (2013). 
45
 Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View, in 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 19, 34 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 
1999). 
46
 James Tobin, A Comment on Dahl’s Skepticism, in CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL THEORY 37, 
38 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordon eds., 1999). 




Security Council, for instance,47 there are undeniable, structural elements of 
democratic deliberation within international courts’ decision-making and 
procedure, such as formal, objective justifications for the adjudicatory activity, 
and the compliance with due process standards based on the rules of the court.48 
 Given the fundamental distinction between deliberation and decision 
also applicable to international courts, it is important to identify which 
deliberative model seems more adequate to describe the dynamics of the Inter-
American Court. 
 
III. GENERAL DELIBERATIVE MODELS: ELEMENTARY DISTINCTIONS 
 Meanwhile, there is an interesting variable relevant to legal research on 
the types of deliberative performances within the decision-making process, i.e. 
the dynamic distance between per curiam and seriatim models. 
 According to the long-established English and American judicial 
tradition, there are three basic schemes of collegiate court deliberation:49 
i) per curiam model: characterized by externalization of the unified 
opinion of the court without publicity of the judges’ individual 
opinions; 
ii) seriatim model: when each judge’s judgment is publicly presented 
one at a time, as an individual opinion, to be used in composing 
a possible myriad of reasonings that might contain the opinion 
of the court;   
iii) hybrid model: centered on externalization of the court’s majority 
opinion, which has synthesized the institutional position, but at 
the same time, the judges may express their concurrent or 
divergent individual opinions. 
 The initial phase of judicial reasoning in a per curiam deliberative 
environment would be quite imperceptible to the general public, as the final, 
explicit product of the deliberation appears as the unified court’s opinion. Based 
on this model, the problem of the topographic location of a precedent, for 
instance, is easily solved by the concentrated factual and legal reasoning 
adopted unanimously or by the majority.50  
 A historic demonstration of the per curiam scheme can be identified in 
the arbitral deliberative model promoted by the Hague system of dispute 
resolution, based on the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. According to the 
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first conference, arbitrators had the right to register their dissent in the award, 
but without any reasoning, while the last one completely suppressed the 
dissenting rule, under the belief that public divergent positions would reveal 
national biases of the arbitrators, which could generate difficulties for the 
implementation of decisions by national States.51 
 In an interesting comparative study, Rufino do Vale asserts that secret 
deliberation is highly consolidated in the Spanish legal order, especially 
regarding constitutional jurisdiction, in order to emphasize the Court’s 
collegiality in generating a unique decision for the general public, even when 
individual opinions are available (hybrid model).52 
 To provide another example of the hybrid scheme, Robert S. Summers 
analyzes the New York State Court of Appeals, where a typical decision is 
preceded by a concentrated majoritarian opinion, followed by diffuse 
concurrent opinions and, if any, divergent opinions. In the hypothesis of 
unanimity, the unified opinion of the Collegiate is published as one sole 
document (if there were no concurrent opinions). In both cases, only the 
majoritarian or the unanimous reasoning has sufficient power to generate a 
binding precedent.53 Based on this judicial practice, other documents of the 
decision cannot attract the ratio decidendi. 
 On the other hand, one clear example of the seriatim model can be found 
in the Brazilian Supreme Court’s decision-making process. Its deliberative 
option was reinforced by the creation of Justice TV (TV Justiça) in 2002 and 
Justice Radio (Rádio Justiça) in 2004, which simultaneously broadcast plenary 
judgments.54 This means that the general public can watch entire live judgments, 
displaying an overly public type of deliberation. The formalistic sequence of the 
judges’ individual opinions, presented one by one according to the Rules of the 
Court, immediately publicizes the judges’ legal reasoning and, after the 
publication of the decision, their written considerations become fully available 
for all.55 
 A relevant uncertainty risk permeates precedent formation in courts that 
adopt the seriatim model. This is based on judges’ individual autonomy in 
presenting their separate opinions and publicly sustaining their persuasive 
arguments, as the judgment itself carries nothing more than a sum of 
monocratic, isolated decisions. Because of the accumulation of diffuse opinions, 
sometimes in a completely inharmonic way, the synthesized opinion of the court 
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might not appear as clear and precise. In this case, the prospective precedent 
would generate similar obscurities and imprecisions.56 
 Based on the inherently structural nature of the precedent for public 
authorities,57 this kind of risk will be detrimental to both external assimilation 
of the judicial reasoning and its internal legal repercussion on future cases. 
 
IV. DELIBERATIVE OPTION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT  
AND THE WEIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL OPINIONS 
 
A. Ad Hoc Judges: A Deviation? 
 Before the analysis the deliberative scheme adopted by the Inter-
American Court, it is necessary to distinguish the categories of ordinary judges 
from ad hoc judges according to the rules applicable to international courts. 
 It is interesting to notice that the Statute of the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ, 1922-1946) had a specific provision on ad hoc 
judges,58 which had caused intense debate in the Advisory Committee of Jurists 
responsible for drafting the Statute. After the great powers had refused the 
proposal which forbade individuals to judge cases connected to their original 
national States,59 the solution found by the Committee in its famous meetings 
of 192060 was the extension of the prerogative for all litigant States, through the 
faculty of ad hoc judge nomination for cases under the Court’s appreciation. 
 During these meetings, the members of the Advisory Committee tackled 
important issues regarding ad hoc judges, such as the problem of the variable 
number of judges in proportion to the number of parties (Loder),61 the ad hoc 
judges’ tendency to express individual opinions dissenting from the majority 
(Lapradelle),62 the prohibition of recording dissent opinions applied to the ad 
hoc judges as a measure of independence with regard to national pressure 
(Lapradelle & Fernandes),63 and the low likelihood of ordinary judges from 
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Asiatic, South-American or “smaller” States which would be compensated by 
the ad hoc judges’ nominations (Phillimore)64.  
 Notwithstanding the prevailing position in the Committee synthetized in 
the final text of Article 31 of the PCIJ Statute,65 the consensus on these issues 
has not always been achieved by Jurists, and defensible divergences remain. 
 These topics can be summed in three essential perspectives: the reason 
d’être of the ad hoc judge, its functional independence, and its distinction 
related to an ordinary (or regular) judge in international adjudicatory 
institutions. 
 First, it is urgent to recognize the immanent deviation from the principle 
of judicial independence (nemo iudex in sua causa)66 generated by the 
participation of national judges in judgments involving their respective national 
States. This originally happened when they were in the position of regular 
judges. Therefore, the justifications for the procedural right to nominate ad hoc 
judges were centered in the equality argument, in order to compensate this 
unbalanced situation inside the international adjudicatory process. 
 Considering the continuity of the PCIJ Statute’s text after the new 
Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1946-),67 which absorbed the 
previous, consolidated rules, this issue focused on the judicial impartiality 
remained as a cogent argument, as pointed out by Fitzmaurice and Guerrero,68 
for whom the independence of the ad hoc judges may be affected by their 
tendency to voice the point of view defended by the government of their 
respective national States. 
 Despite these criticisms, part of the specialized legal literature sustains 
that there is sufficient support to ad hoc judges in the ICJ’s institutional practice, 
based on which the negative aspects apparently would not affect the credibility 
and independence of the Court.69 On the other hand, even though the 
quantitative analysis of the ICJ’s judgments shows a few voting tendencies of 
national judges (regular and ad hoc), they are always a small minority, not more 
than two in the entire Court.70 Additionally, the ad hoc judges “shall not be 
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taken into account for the calculation of the quorum” based on the Rules of the 
Court (Article 20.3).71 
 Under the historical inspiration of the World Court’s model, the Inter-
American System on Human Rights has accepted the ad hoc judges in the 
composition of the Court during judgments.72 
 Theoretically, the participation of ad hoc judges in the Inter-American 
Court could possibly explain a high number of separate opinions. According to 
the Pact of San José,73 the respondent States have the option of appointing one 
ad hoc judge, when there is not a permanent judge of its own nationality in the 
collegiate body. In this sense, the natural conclusion would be the moral duty 
of the ad hoc judges to present individual opinions in the judgments, even if to 
publicly justify their appointments. 
 Nevertheless, there is no reasonable justification for the ad hoc judges 
to participate every case before human rights courts. These cases are based on 
the individual procedural initiative against the State, differently from the classic 
international adjudication State vis-à-vis State.74  
 In this sense, the Inter-American Court has changed its understanding 
on the subject in the Advisory Opinion OC-20/09 requested by Argentina, when 
the Tribunal concluded that the appointment of ad hoc judges is restricted to 
contentious cases originated by inter-state communications, but not by 
individual petitions.75 Afterwards, the Rules of the Court were adapted to this 
new position, stating that the national judge of the respondent State shall not 
participate in the hearing and deliberation of individual cases,76 in order to 
restore the original solution discussed during the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists’ meetings of 1920.77 
 Therefore, changes in the Court’s rules and practice on ad hoc judges 
have intensely impacted the quantitative analyses, including the complete 
cessation of occurrences of separate opinions by ad hoc judges after 2011.78 
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B. Legal Tradition of Separate Opinions and the  
Inter-American Court’s Early Years 
 Another aspect that deserves our attention concerns the secrecy inherent 
in the deliberative process adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. According to its Statute, the Court “shall deliberate in private” and “its 
deliberations shall remain secret”, with exceptions decided by the Collegiate 
(Article 24.2).79 Additionally, the Rules of the Court reinforce this procedural 
choice when they register that “only the Judges shall take part in the 
deliberations”, under the assistance of secretariat members (Article 15.2).80 
Nevertheless, the secret deliberative pattern does not mean enclosing the 
separate opinion’s content, based on the long-standing tradition of national and 
international judicial deliberation.81  
 Seen from a formal perspective, the legal support for the individual 
opinion manifestation is based on the American Convention on Human 
Rights,82 the Court’s Statute83 and Rules of Procedure84, which recognized this 
procedural right to all Inter-American judges. 
 Similarly to the legal basis for ad hoc judges, the tradition for the rules 
of Court on separate opinions can be found in the Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice (1920)85 and, subsequently, in the International Court of 
Justice’s Statute itself (1946)86. However, as mentioned above, it is important 
to notate that a previous debate had taken place in the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists (1920), when a proposal for forbidding the publicity of national judges’ 
dissenting opinions was overthrown.87 
                                                 
79
 Organization of American States, General Assembly Res. 448, Statute of the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80 (IX-0/79) (Oct. 1979), http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/about-us/estatuto. 
80
 Rules of Procedure, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/reglamento/nov_
2009_ing.pdf. 
81
 See Kurt H. Nadelmann, The Judicial Dissent: Publication v. Secrecy, 8 AM. J. COMP. L. 415 
(1959). 
82
 American Convention, supra note 18 (“Article 66. […] 2. If the judgment does not represent 
in whole or in part the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to have his 
dissenting or separate opinion attached to the judgment”). 
83
 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Statute, supra note 79 (“Article 24. […] 3. The decisions, judgments and 
opinions of the Court shall be delivered in public session, and the parties shall be given written 
notification thereof. In addition, the decisions, judgments and opinions shall be published, along 
with judges' individual votes and opinions and with such other data or background information 
that the Court may deem appropriate”). 
84
 Rules of Procedure, supra note 80 (“Article 65. […] 2. Any judge who has taken part in the 
consideration of a case is entitled to append a separate reasoned opinion to the judgment, 
concurrent or dissenting. These opinions shall be submitted within a time limit to be fixed by 
the President so that the other judges may take cognizance thereof before notice of the judgment 
is served. Said opinions shall only refer to the issues covered in the judgment”). 
85 PCIJ Statute, supra note 58 (“Article 57. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in 
part the unanimous opinion of the judges, dissenting judges are entitled to deliver a separate 
opinion”). 
86
 ICJ Statute, supra note 67 (“Article 57. If the judgment does not represent in whole or in part 
the unanimous opinion of the judges, any judge shall be entitled to deliver a separate opinion”). 
87
 See Jhabvala, supra note 4, at 35-38; see also P.C.I.J. Advisory Committee of Jurists, supra 
note 60, at 591-92. 




 Historically, the Inter-American Court’s first three official judgments, 
dated 1987, seem to take the per curiam model, which is shown by the total 
absence of individual opinions.88 However, according to Thomas Buergenthal, 
the very first judgment of the Court, the In the Matter of Viviana Gallardo et al. 
case (1981), was a truly contentious case rather than a request for an advisory 
opinion,89 whose inadmissibility by the Court revealed strong procedural 
failures of the parties. This case was also remarkable because of the first 
separate opinion originally presented in the history of the Court (Judge Piza 
Escalante).90  
 Therefore, the definitive option for the hybrid scheme became clear after 
the fourth judgment related to the Velásquez Rodríguez case (merits).91 In this 
model, the Court generates a consolidated document which represents the 
opinion of the Court (unanimous or majority), while judges are allowed to 
present separate individual opinions, including joint opinions given by two or 
more judges. 
 Nevertheless, the individual opinions not only performed an exclusive 
adjudicatory behavior applicable to judgments, but also to advisory opinions 
given by the Court. In this sense, it is urgent to refer to the OC-3/83 (Restrictions 
to the Death Penalty),92 which had separate opinions by Judges Carlos Roberto 
Reina and Piza Escalante, and OC-4/84 (Proposed Amendments of the 
Naturalization Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica),93 which had 
individual opinions by Judges Piza Escalante and Thomas Buergenthal. 
 
C. Quantitative Data: Parameters in Judgments and Advisory Opinions 
     
 Through a recent search in the Court’s website,94 it was possible to 
identify a total of 338 judgments in litigant cases, consisting of preliminary 
objections, judgments of merits, joint judgments of preliminary objections and 
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merits, and requests for interpretation, including the advisory opinions as part 
of the adjudicatory activity.95 
 In this sense, I have followed these premises:  
i) when the same judge has presented more than one documented 
opinion on the same judgment or advisory opinion, only one 
opinion was counted;  
ii) when there were separate opinions shared by more than one judge, 
including permanent and ad hoc judges, each judge was counted 
as an independent individual opinion;  
iii) when the same judge simultaneously presented concurrent and 
divergent positions in an individual opinion for the same 
judgment, only one dissenting opinion was counted;  
iv) the first judgment analyzed was the Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. 
Honduras (preliminary objections), dated June 26, 1987, and the 
last one was the Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru (preliminary 
objections, merits, reparation and costs), dated August 31, 2017; 
v) the first advisory opinion analyzed was the OC-1/82 of September 24, 
1982, and the last one was the OC-24/17 of November 24, 2017. 
 After counting all judgments individually, I identified 153 judgments 
which had no individual opinion attached, in contrast to 185 others which had 
individual opinions (concurrent or divergent), i.e. about 55% of the Court’s 




With / Without Individual Opinions 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017) 
Without Individual Opinions 153 (45.3%) 
With Individual Opinions 185 (54.7%) 
Total 338 
 
 During this data search, I identified some extraordinary occurrences, 
such as 4 cases in which 6 individual opinions were attached to a single 
judgment.96 This is very interesting as the Court consists of only 7 permanent 
judges and, when applicable, 1 ad hoc judge.  
 At this point, it is appropriate to register the Shabtai Rosenne’s 
warning,97 for whom the extensive use of separate opinions in international 
courts may fracture the final judicial statement and, eventually, weaken its 
external, legal force. 
 According to quantitative data, a significant difference was founded 
between concurrent and divergent separate opinions in both categories of judges 
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(permanent and ad hoc). For a total of 359 separate opinions (documents), there 
were only 100 divergent individual opinions, i.e. for each divergent opinion 2.59 
concurring separate opinions were identified in judgments (Table 2). Differently 
from the previous table, here I counted the number of individual opinions as the 




Separate Opinions by Conclusion (per document) 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017) 
Concurrent Opinions 259 (72.1%) 
Divergent Opinions 100 (27.9%) 
Total 359 
 
 Analyzing the percentage of separate opinions related to the consultative 
activity of the Inter-American Court, the scenario was slightly different, when I 
found 24 advisory opinions in the Court’s history until November 2017 and, 




With / Without Individual Opinions 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017) 
Without Individual Opinions 12 (50%) 
With Individual Opinions 12 (50%) 
Total 24 
 
 On the other hand, the proportion of concurrent and dissenting 
individual opinions in connection with the Court’s consultative function was 




Separate Opinions by Conclusion (per document) 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017) 
Concurrent Opinions 21 (67.7%) 
Divergent Opinions 10 (32.3%) 
Total 31 
 
 In spite of the quantitative difference between the numbers of judgments 
and advisory opinions produced throughout the history of the Court, some of 
                                                 
98
 For instance, a single divergent separate opinion document was counted as one occurrence, 
even when it had three joint individual opinions (e.g.: the joint partially dissenting opinion of 
Judges Ventura Robles, Vio Grossi and Eduardo Ferrer in the case of Mémoli v. Argentina, 








these data reveal interesting similarities, which can be used to analyze 
adjudicatory patterns. In this sense, the high percentage of concurrent opinions 
is a coincident aspect in both categories of adjudicatory manifestations (around 
70%). 
 
D. Quantitative Data: Ad Hoc Judges 
 Opportunely, based on the analysis of all concurrent and divergent 
individual opinions registered in 185 judgments (Table 1), one interesting fact 
has emerged: the large majority of the separate opinions were made by regular, 
not ad hoc judges.  
 In evaluating the separate opinions presented by each permanent judge, 
whether isolated or joined by other judge(s), I found a total of 312 occurrences, 
in contrast to only 49 individual opinions presented by ad hoc judges (Table 5). 
This means that, throughout the history of the Inter-American Court, about 14% 
of the individual opinions were given by ad hoc judges, and about 86% were 




Individual Opinions by Category of Judges 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017) 
Regular Judges 312 (86.4%) 
Ad Hoc Judges 49 (13.6%) 
Total 361 
 
 Based on these data, I considered it necessary to verify whether the 
enormous amount of separate opinions is connected to a historical institutional 
characteristic, definitive feature in the Inter-American Court, or whether it is 
just the result of the personal behavior by a small group of judges, which 
artificially increased this number.    
 Strictly considering the ad hoc category, it is possible to identify an 
aspect related to the unbalanced performance of some judges in comparison to 
others. Despite individual opinions given by 26 different authors, just 5 ad hoc 
judges have issued 20 separate opinions, which means that 20% of the judges 
produced about 40% of the occurrences (Table 6).101 
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 Ad hoc Judges Vidal Ramírez (7), Montiel Argüello (5), Novales Aguirre (3), Roberto F. 
Caldas (3) and Cançado Trindade (2).   






Individual Opinions by each Ad Hoc Judge 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017) 
Ad Hoc Judges Individual Opinions 
Vidal Ramírez 7 (14.3%) 
Montiel Argüello 5 (10.2%) 
Novales Aguirre 3 (6.1%) 
Roberto F. Caldas 3 (6.1%) 
Cançado Trindade 2 (4.1%) 
Orihuela Iberico 2 (4.1%) 
Julio A. Barberis 2 (4.1%) 
Martínez Gálvez 2 (4.1%) 
Fogel Pedrozo 2 (4.1%) 
Rodríguez Pinzón 2 (4.1%) 
García Toma 2 (4.1%) 
Pasceri Scaramuzza 2 (4.1%) 
Alejandro Espinosa 2 (4.1%) 
Larraondo Salguero 1 (2.0%) 
Charles N. Brower 1 (2.0%) 
Gil Lavedra 1 (2.0%) 
Salgado Pesantes 1 (2.0%) 
Camacho Paredes 1 (2.0%) 
Santistevan de Noriega 1 (2.0%) 
Zafra Roldán 1 (2.0%) 
Herrador Sandoval 1 (2.0%) 
Castellanos Howell 1 (2.0%) 
López Medina 1 (2.0%) 
Cadena Rámila 1 (2.0%) 
Biel-Morales 1 (2.0%) 
Mac-Gregor Poisot 1 (2.0%) 
Total 49 
 
 On the other hand, it was not possible to identify a numerically 
extraordinary production of separate opinions by any specific ad hoc judge 
during the Inter-American Court’s history, based on the peculiar nature of this 
jurisdictional performance designated to decide case by case. According to this 
characteristic, the most frequent occurrences were 7 individual opinions by ad 
hoc Judge Vidal Ramírez and 5 by Montiel Argüello. 
 Opportunely, as explained in Section IV.B, changes in the rules and 
practice of the Court has caused the complete absence of individual opinions 
produced by ad hoc judges in judgments after 2011, which affected their 
numbers even further. 
 
  




E. Quantitative Data: Regular Judges 
  Continuing the comparison of judges in the same category, it is clear 
that a few permanent judges have produced a high number of separate opinions, 
as the following data elucidate. 
 Based on the Table 7, about 51% of the total number of individual 
opinions were given by only 3 regular judges. Therefore, considering 312 
separate opinions, 159 individual manifestations were produced by Judges 
Cançado Trindade (69), García Ramírez (61) and Vio Grossi (29). Accordingly, 
one out of every two opinions presented in judgments during the Court’s history 




Individual Opinions by each Regular Judge 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017) 
Regular Judges Individual Opinions 
Cançado Trindade 69 (22.1%) 
García Ramírez 61 (19.6%) 
Vio Grossi 29 (9.3%) 
Mac-Gregor Poisot 23 (7.4%) 
Ventura Robles 18 (5.8%) 
Medina Quiroga 13 (4.2%) 
García-Sayán 13 (4.2%) 
Pérez Pérez 13 (4.2%) 
Roux Rengifo 12 (3.8%) 
Sierra Porto 11 (3.5%) 
Roberto F. Caldas 8 (2.6%) 
Abreu Burelli 8 (2.6%) 
Oliver Jackman 7 (2.2%) 
Salgado Pesantes 7 (2.2%) 
Pacheco Gómez 4 (1.3%) 
Montiel Argüello 4 (1.3%) 
Piza Escalante 3 (1.0%) 
May Macaulay 3 (1.0%) 
Abreu Blondet 2 (0.6%) 
Picado Sotela 1 (0.3%) 
Aguiar Aranguren 1 (0.3%) 
Nieto Navia 1 (0.3%) 
Leonardo Franco 1 (0.3%) 
Total 312 
 
 Apparently, the disproportional distribution and concentration of 
individual opinions produced by a few permanent judges is a common 
phenomenon which I have also identified in the performance of the Inter-
American Court’s consultative jurisdiction.  




 Considering the universe of 17 judges, only 5 (about 30%) were 
responsible for about 50% of all individual opinions presented in advisory 
opinions (Table 8). These data demonstrate that the observed phenomenon in 
the Court’s advisory opinions involved a high concentration of separate 
opinions by a small group of judges, even if it was not as high as the 




Individual Opinions by each Regular Judge 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: Sept. 1982 – Nov. 2017) 
Regular Judges Individual Opinions 
Piza Escalante 4 (12.5%) 
García Ramírez 4 (12.5%) 
Cançado Trindade 4 (12.5%) 
Thomas Buergenthal 2 (6.3%) 
Vio Grossi 2 (6.3%) 
Pedro Nikken 2 (6.3%) 
Oliver Jackman 2 (6.3%) 
Rafael Navia 2 (6.3%) 
Sierra Porto 2 (6.3%) 
Carlos Roberto Reina 1 (3.1%) 
Máximo Cisneros 1 (3.1%) 
Pacheco Gómez 1 (3.1%) 
Gros Espiell 1 (3.1%) 
Salgado Pesantes 1 (3.1%) 
Abreu Burelli 1 (3.1%) 
Roberto Caldas 1 (3.1%) 
Pérez Pérez 1 (3.1%) 
Total 32 
 
 Another interesting aspect may be gleaned from a coincidence: most 
individual opinions both in judgments and advisory opinions were given by the 
same three judges, i.e. Judges Cançado Trindade and García Ramírez, followed 
by Vio Grossi.  
 Furthermore, it is important to register that these three judges were re-
elected for a second term,102 which means a double mandate of 12 years for each 
one in the Court. Notwithstanding this fact, there also are eight other regular 
judges who have exercised two terms in the Tribunal,103 and these judges have 
not given such a disproportionate number of separate opinions. 
 Even considering the peculiar nature of the consultative function, the 
high number of individual opinions connected to the Court’s adjudicatory 
activity in its entirety seems to demonstrate the prevalence of personal 
                                                 
102
 See Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Jueces que Han Integrado la Corte Interamericana de Derechos 
Humanos, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/compos16/juecesordenalfabetico.pdf. 
103
 Judges Abreu Burelli, Fix-Zamudio, García Sayán, Oliver Jackman, Nieto Navia, Pacheco 
Gómez, Salgado Pesantes and Ventura Robles. 




performances in detriment of a well-distributed institutional decision-making 
pattern.  
 
F. Separate Opinions as Core Reasoning of Subsequent Cases 
 In order to check the explicit use of individual opinions by the Inter-
American Court in its core reasoning, one last search was conducted in all 338 
judgments and 24 advisory opinions available at the Court’s institutional 
website.104  
 As a result, it was possible to identify only three express quotations of 
separate opinions in the Court’s reasoning (judgments and advisory opinions): 
 
TABLE 9 
Judgments and Advisory Opinions 
Individual Opinions Expressly Cited in Core Reasoning 
(Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.: June 1987 – Aug. 2017) 




Baena Ricardo et al. v. 
Panama, Judgment of 





Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Cançado Trindade 
In: Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03 of September 17, 
2003, ¶ 81. 
 
“81. One ought to secure a 
follow-up to the endeavours of 
greater doctrinal and 
jurisprudencial development of 
the peremptory norms of 
international law (jus cogens) and 
of the corresponding obligations 
erga omnes of protection of the 
human being, moved above all by 
the opinio juris as a manifestation 
of the universal juridical 
conscience, to the benefit of all 
human beings. By means of this 
conceptual development one will 
advance in the overcoming of the 
obstacles of the dogmas of the 
past and in the creation of a true 
international ordre public based 
upon the respect for, and 
observance of, human rights 
(…)”.106 
  
                                                 
104
 During the data search, we accessed each judgment and individually searched for the 
occurrences of the words “voto,” “votos,” “opinión” and “opiniones.” These are adopted by the 
Inter-American Court as the Spanish version of “individual opinion” and “separate opinion.” 
For each word found, I have read the respective paragraph and footnote looking for explicit 
citations of separate opinions used as part of the Court’s fundamental reasoning: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/cf/Jurisprudencia2/index.cfm?lang=es. 
105
 Baena Ricardo et al. v. Panama, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
104, ¶ 102 & n.70 (Nov. 28, 2003). 
106
 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 
18, ¶ 81 (Sept. 17, 2003). 








Castañeda Gutman v. 
México, Judgment of 






Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Piza Escalante 
In: Advisory Opinion OC-
7/85 of August 29, 1986, ¶ 
27. 
 
“27. (…) Some rights, 
however, due to their nature or to 
the wording of the Convention, 
lack this immediate and full 
enforceability unless domestic 
norms or other complementary 
measures grant it, as is the case 
for example with political rights 
(…) or those of judicial protection 
(…). If there are no electoral 
codes or laws, voter rolls, political 
parties, means of publicity and 
transportation, voting centers, 
electoral boards, dates and time 
periods for the exercise of the 
right to vote, this right, by its very 
nature, simply can not be 
exercised; nor can the right to 
judicial protection be exercised 
unless there are courts to grant it 
and there are procedural standards 




Río Negro Massacres 
v. Guatemala, 
Judgment of 




Concurring Opinion of 
Judge Cançado Trindade 
In: Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03 of September 17, 
2003, ¶ 75. 
“75. In a well-known obiter 
dictum in its Judgment in the case 
of the Barcelona Traction (…), 
the International Court of Justice 
determined that there are certain 
international obligations erga 
omnes, obligations of a State vis-
à-vis the international community 
as a whole, which are of the 
interest of all the States (…). The 
prohibitions mentioned in this 
obiter dictum are not exhaustive: 
to them new prohibitions are 
added (…) precisely for not being 
the jus cogens a closed category 
(…)”.110 
 
 These data admit some preliminary interpretations, such as:  
i) in general, the Inter-American Court hardly ever quotes individual 
opinions in the core reasoning of its judgments and advisory 
opinions (about 0.83%);  
                                                 
107
 Castañeda Gutman v. México, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 184, ¶ 159 & n.55 (Aug. 6, 2008). 
108
 Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1(1) and 2 American 
Convention on Human Rights), Separate Opinion of Judge Rodolfo E. Piza Escalante, Advisory 
Opinion OC-7/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 7, ¶ 27 (Aug. 29, 1986). 
109
 Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparation, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 141 & n.218 (Sept. 4, 2012). 
110
 Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Separate Opinion of Judge 
Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 
18, ¶ 75 (Sept. 17, 2003). 




ii) the Court has strictly quoted separate opinions originated from its 
consultative jurisdiction, not from judgments;  
iii) no dissenting opinions were mentioned, only concurrent ones; 
iv) one specific individual opinion was cited in two of the three 
occurrences, but related to different original parts; 
v) the quoted theses were connected to notorious themes of the 
International Human Rights Law and the International Law, on 
which highly controversial debates in specialized legal literature 
had occurred:111 the universal perspective of jus cogens norms, 
the effective granting of political rights, and the progressive 
nature of erga omnes obligations. 
   
               
CONCLUSION 
 Based on this short analysis, it is possible to conclude that the hybrid 
deliberative model adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
displays some structural tendencies related to the seriatim scheme. This is 
shown by the numerically relevant and inconstant production of individual 
opinions verifiable in the adjudicatory activity as a whole (judgments and 
advisory opinions). 
 Nevertheless, the accessible location of the core reasoning of collegiate 
deliberation, by majority or unanimity, makes it easy to find the ratio decidendi 
as the Court’s institutional position, even when I found a disproportionately 
large number of individual opinions in judgments. On the other hand, the Court 
had a more balanced rate of separate opinions related to its consultative function 
(advisory opinions), but with some similarities with the judgments in regard to 
the high level of concurrent opinions. 
 According to the quantitative data searched, one possible explanation for 
the high number of separate opinions can be found in the personal behavior of 
a relatively small group of judges, rather than in a well-distributed deliberative 
institutional practice. Even when I verified the writing manifestations of ad hoc 
judges, a perceptible level of concentration of individual opinions could be 
noticed. 
 Setting aside the rare exceptions related to the incorporation of only two 
separate opinions originated from advisory opinions in three different 
judgments, the hybrid deliberative scheme in the Inter-American Court tends to 
isolate the ratio decidendi from the influence of past individual opinions. 
Cogitating the case law’s premise in International Law, the separate opinions 
might be considered a relevant source of international legal doctrine, but not as 
an explicit part of the Inter-American precedent. In addition, the use of 
individual opinions by respondent States in their briefs before the Court may be 
understood according to this same doctrinal perspective. 
                                                 
111
 Accord, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1421-51 
(2007); DAVID ALTMAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY WORLDWIDE 32-44 (2011); MAURIZIO RAGAZZI, 
THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 43-73 (1997); Dire Tladi 
(Special Rapporteur), Third Rep. on Peremptory Norms of General International Law (jus 
cogens), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/714 (Feb. 12, 2018), http://legal.un.org/docs/?symbol=A/CN.4/
714. 




 As it seems verifiable in the practice of the International Court of 
Justice,112 the Inter-American Court resists to adopt expressly separate opinions 
(concurring or dissenting) as part of the core reasoning of its judgments. On the 
other hand, I must admit that those three exceptional quotations of past 
individual opinions identified during the research were an interesting surprise, 
especially because of the controversial themes involved (jus cogens norms, 
political rights, and erga omnes obligations). 
 Remembering Rosenne’s concern about the immanent risks of extensive 
use of individual opinions in international adjudication,113 perhaps it is time to 
evaluate whether or not the atomistic behavior of some judges within the 
collegiate body could debilitate the institutional position of the Inter-American 
Court, which can possibly affect its public authority before the States Parties to 
the American Convention on Human Rights.114  
 
                                                 
112
 See MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, PRECEDENT IN THE WORLD COURT 191-95 (1996). 
113
 Rosenne, supra note 97, at 135. 
114
 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack, The Judicial Trilemma, 111 AM. J. INT’L L. 225, 
274-75 (2017). 
